This paper reviews the design and performance of monetary policy in South Africa (SA) during 1994-2004. Quantitative indexes of transparency reveal a strong rise in the transparency and accountability of monetary policy between 1994 and 2004. Inflation and interest rate expectations data and forward interest rate data are used to demonstrate the increased credibility and reasonable predictability of monetary policy since adopting inflation targeting in 2000. The SA Reserve Bank's view on monetary policy transmission channels is discussed, and its recent forecasting performance is evaluated. We find that monetary policy decisions taken in response to external and domestic shocks under inflation targeting have significantly improved relative to the preceding framework, though data quality has been a constraint. Further, inflation targeting has not disadvantaged potential investment in terms of the level of tax-adjusted real interest rates. Finally, the important role for complementary policies to support monetary policy is motivated.
Introduction
1 Acquiring credibility and a good reputation in macro-policy is a key for attracting foreign investment, and encouraging long-term domestic investment (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) . In this paper, we examine the monetary policy legacy of the last decade. We argue that the inflation targeting framework introduced in 2000, see Van der Merwe (2004) , has improved the credibility and effectiveness of macro-economic policy. The criticism the new framework has received is largely misconceived. favourably with the savage rate rises in the 1997-1998 currency depreciation, and misguided currency market interventions, incurring great costs to the public finances and in growth foregone. In Table 1 , we compare some macroeconomic aggregates and their volatility 2 What interpretation to put on these comparisons is far from obvious. There has been much international debate about the causes of the 'great moderation': that is, the decline in inflation, inflation volatility and output volatility observed across the industrialised world since 1 This is an independent review of monetary and exchange rate policy in South Africa during [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . It has been conducted with publicly available information, and without access to unpublished minutes of MPC meetings, unpublished econometric models, or unpublished memos of the South African Reserve Bank. A review commissioned from P. Mohr in 2001, with access to MPC meetings, has never been published (see media statement, July 2001, South African Reserve Bank website). 2 This measure is defined as the absolute value of the difference in annual percentage rates of change between a variable in the current quarter and its value 4 quarters ago.
the early 1980s, see Bernanke (2004) . We will argue that the new monetary policy regime has enabled South Africa to participate in these global trends, despite major exchange rate shocks.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the design and operational framework of monetary policy. Section 3 assesses the view of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) on monetary policy transmission. In Section 4, the transparency, credibility and predictability of monetary policy is examined. We construct quantitative indexes of transparency in 1994 and 2004 and consider whether the transparency of the SARB has been increased by adopting inflation targeting. Expectations data and forward interest rate data are used to assess the changing credibility and predictability of policy under inflation targeting. In Section 5 the forecasting performance of the SARB is evaluated, and monetary policy decisions taken in response to external and domestic shocks in both the Stals and Mboweni eras are critically assessed. We also consider whether monetary policy has reduced interest rate and output volatility, and has stabilised the business cycle. In Section 6, we tackle the controversial issue of whether real interest rates have been too high in SA, and to what extent this is linked with the inflation targeting regime. Section 7 concludes with a summary, and a discussion of the limits of monetary policy and the important role for complementary policies.
2.
The design and operational framework of monetary policy
Monetary policy regimes prior to inflation targeting
There have been three broad monetary policy regimes since the 1960s ( Table 2 ). The first regime was a liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit, and operated until the early 1980s. A range of reforms enacted from the early 1980s toward a cash reserves-based system followed the recommendations of the de Kock Commission Reports (1978, 1985) . After gradual technical changes on assets requirements, and a redefinition of the role of the discount rate, this second regime was in full operation by mid-1985 (see Gidlow, 1995a,b) .
Under the cash reserves system, the SARB's discount rate influenced the cost of overnight collateralised lending and hence market interest rates. The supply of credit was influenced by open market operations and various other policies acting on overall liquidity. By creating a persistent "money market shortage" and setting the bank rate at a relatively high level, the commercial bank rates were typically closely linked to the bank rate. Monetary control was deemed to operate indirectly through the slowing of the demand for money, with an estimated lag for its ultimate effect on inflation of over twelve months (e.g. Stals, 1995a) .
Pre-announced monetary target ranges, which by then had already been abandoned by the UK and US, were used from 1986 for a broad definition of money (M3), following recommendations of the de Kock Commission (1985) . Target ranges were set annually using a three-month moving average of broad money growth, and were announced in the March Budget to cover the period from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year. The setting of the target aimed both to accommodate projected real GDP growth and to contain inflation, though the procedure used to choose the target was not transparent. As with the Bundesbank (Clarida and Gertler, 1997) , these targets were intended as guidelines, rather than strict rules. The SARB had discretion to breach targets, for instance in the face of external trade and financial shocks. There was no penalty for breaching targets; nor was there a legally required public explanation when breaching targets (as for the Bundesbank).
Any usefulness of these targets was sharply diminished by extensive financial liberalisation beginning in the 1980s and larger capital flows from 1994. From 1990, the guidelines 3 were supplemented by an eclectic set of indicators, including the exchange rate, asset prices, output gap, balance of payments, wage settlements, total credit extension, and the fiscal stance (Stals, 1997) . Such indicators probably played a role in earlier years, but the weights applied to them were not revealed. Policy was very opaque in this period, and this diminished the accountability of the SARB. For instance, policy actions during 1996 and 1998 were sometimes highly questionable, and costly both to the fiscus and to economic growth. Aron and Muellbauer (2002b) use extended Taylor Rule models (Taylor, 1993) to try to estimate the weights applied to different policy objectives in the interest rate rule during 1986-97.
Simple Taylor rules, even when augmented for foreign interest rate influences and interest rate smoothing, and based either on forecast, or actual, inflation and output gap measures, poorly describe the behaviour of the discount rate. A satisfactory model requires inclusion of the deviation of money growth from target in the rule, and controlling for extensive financial liberalisation. In practice, the central bank emphasised current inflation (with a low weight on the output gap), despite claiming to focus largely on money growth targeting. The weight attached to inflation is in the region of 0.8 to 1.1, well below that found for policy rules in other countries. 4 3 In 1990, the term "money supply targets" was replaced by "money supply guidelines". 4 For a range of countries, Clarida et al (1998) found values for of 1 or higher in the post 1979 period (e.g. the weight is 1.8 for the Federal Reserve, 2 for Japan and 1.3 for the Bundesbank).
A third system of monetary accommodation was introduced from March 1998, with the repurchase (repo) interest rate being market-determined in daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions. A full provision of the estimated daily liquidity requirement of banks indicated a neutral position on the part of the SARB, while marginal over-or under-provision signalled a preference for stabilising the repo rate at prevailing levels (Stals, 1999 ). Significant over-or under-provision of liquidity signalled a preference for movement in the repo rate.
Auctions with a predetermined fixed interest rate were used in the early days of the new system, which fix was discontinued in early 2000. Initially, there was little difference in interest rate behaviour between the second two regimes: even under price auctioning, the commercial banks collectively remained heavily influenced by SARB-directed preferences for the level of the interest rate. With a poorly functioning money market, dominated by a few large banks, rates proved inflexible and the interbank market did not always clear effectively. Various changes to the system were instituted from in May, 2005 5 , and helped increase participation in the market. The spread between the repo rate and interbank call rate was altered in September with a 100 basis point fall in the repo rate (a "technical adjustment"). The repo rate is now fixed to eliminate any ambiguity about SARB policy signals. Daily auctions have been replaced by weekly repurchase auctions with a seven day maturity, and the amounts allotted are announced after the tender, rather than before, as previously. Since May, 2005, an estimate of the average daily market liquidity requirement is announced prior to the auction to assist tendering.
Further types of auctions may be held at the SARB's discretion to accommodate liquidity requirements and stabilize interbank rates. A daily benchmark is provided by the SARB for money market interest rates.
Inflation targeting
The adoption of inflation targeting in 2000 aimed to enhance policy transparency, accountability and predictability. The system has seen several improvements with evolving institutional design since 2000 (see Van der Merwe, 2004) 6 . Currently, the inflation target aims to achieve a rate of increase in the overall consumer price index, excluding the mortgage interest cost (the so-called Several early versions of an "escape" clause were designed to create more transparency about the discretion the central bank must use in these circumstances. 9 In November, 2003, the SARB in consultation with the National Treasury revised the "escape" clause for more flexibility and clarity, repackaging it as a forward-looking "explanation clause". The mortgage interest cost measures mortgage related housing costs in the CPI. Raising interest rates to counter inflationary pressures also raises the interest cost component of measured inflation. Unless excluded, this could provoke a further tightening of monetary policy. 8 Aron and Muellbauer (2004a) construct a measure of CPIX (metropolitan) for forecasting and modeling purposes, back to 1970 on monthly data, using a consistent methodology. 9 A letter to the Governor from the Minister of Finance at the inception of inflation targeting (but released only in June, 2001), contained an "escape clause" suggesting failure to meet the target would require a full explanation on the part of the SARB. There was an "escape clause" in the inflation targeting statement in the appendix to the MPC statement, April 6, 2000. A further clause can be found in the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, October, 2001. 10 "When the economy is buffeted by a supply side shock similar to those envisaged by the original escape clause that will take inflation outside the target range (e.g. an oil price shock, a drought, a natural disaster,
The process of interest rate setting can broadly be described by Svensson's recommended moderate policy of flexible and forward-looking 11 inflation targeting (Svensson et al, 2002) , so coping reasonably well with supply shocks. Inflation is not controlled at the shortest possible horizon by aggressive and volatile policy, but rather at a longer horizon of two to three years. The flexible approach aims also to stabilise the business cycle and hence the output gap. In the shortterm inflation may well deviate, and sometimes significantly, from the target.
Assessment of the SARB's view of monetary policy transmission
The current SARB view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is cogently summarised in a two-page box in the Monetary Policy Review (May 2004) . This is thoroughly informed by recent literature, such as Bean et al (2002) . It emphasises the asset price channel via bonds, equities, the exchange rate and property prices and notes that "the role of expectations of economic agents in determining the impact of monetary policy changes is difficult to restrict to a particular channel" (in the flow chart which illustrates the channels).
This recent view is a considerable advance on the flow chart presented by Smal and de Jager (2001) , chart 1, p.5. This shows a channel from the repo rate through 'money and credit' to 'inflationary expectations' to 'wages' to the inflation rate. This is the only place inflationary expectations appear in their flow chart. It is extremely restrictive to say that the only role for inflationary expectations is to influence wages, while the only influence on these expectations is money and credit. The rational expectations approach has long suggested more eclectic expectations channels.
There is evidence that wage setting in SA is quite backward-looking (Aron et al, 2003) .
Wages appear to be unaffected by information less than two quarters old and there is no role for expectations proxies, including forecasts of inflation rates and exchange rate changes derived from econometric models. This suggests wage negotiators take account of the state of the economy as revealed in the data of the previous quarter, and settlements come into force one or financial contagion affecting the currency), at the subsequent meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, the SARB will fully inform the public of the nature of the 'shock', the anticipated impact on CPIX inflation and the monetary policy response to ensure that inflation returns to the target and the time frame over which this will occur." (Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, November 2003 Neither of the SARB reviews of monetary policy transmission mentions the cost channel, see Barth and Ramey (2001) , whereby higher interest rates may raise the cost of capital for firms and households and who may try to pass these costs on. This has a special relevance in SA where the mortgage interest rate currently has a weight of 10.32 percent in the headline CPI and other interest rates also enter in a more minor way. The move to CPIX, which excludes mortgage costs, as the inflation target for the SARB was designed to give a more coherent target and to wean price setters off this mechanism whereby higher interest rates designed to reduce inflation, automatically increase CPI inflation first.
Our research on wages finds an additional short-term cost push effect from the change in the prime rate 12 on wage settlements, even when long-run indexation to CPI (incorporating mortgage costs) is taken into account. However, we also find evidence of another asset price channel sometimes omitted in discussions of monetary transmission: we find that rising house prices 13 have a positive effect on wage settlements two quarters later. Given an average lag of four quarters for house prices, it is plausible that part of the effect operates through the effect of rising house prices subsequently raising rents. Since we also show that interest rates have strong effects on house prices, this is one route by which higher rates reduce inflation. (2002)). Muellbauer (2000a,b, 2006a ) estimated a long-run propensity to spend for SA out of housing wealth of between 7 and 10 percent. This implies that a 10 percent rise in real house prices 15 would raise consumption by 0.6-0.9 percent. Given the rapid transmission from the repo rate to the mortgage bond rate, and powerful effects from the latter onto house prices and so housing wealth and consumption, it is not surprising to find powerful monetary policy transmission in SA. Understanding the mechanics of the household part of the channel, of which the housing wealth element is only a part, can suggest other policy interventions or institutional changes that might offset or stabilise part of this mechanism (see section 7).
One other remark about monetary transmission is in order. It is often said that monetary policy has no effect on output in the long-run. However, there is a large body of economic theory suggesting that high uncertainty impedes investment and considerable empirical evidence of a negative link from inflation volatility to growth (e.g., Judson and Orphanides, 1996; Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) . If a change in the monetary policy regime can bring about a lowering of volatility and uncertainty, there could be important benefits for growth, productivity and welfare in the long run. The SARB in its communications could do more to embed the case for a monetary policy regime that aims to reduce uncertainty, because of these long-run output and welfare benefits. The poor, with few assets or access to credit to cushion them from inflation shocks, are likely to be amongst the biggest beneficiaries of a less volatile inflation environment.
4.
Transparency, credibility and predictability of monetary policy 14 Housing, Consumption and EMU, HM Treasury, 2003 15 Housing wealth and other liquid and illiquid wealth measures were constructed in Aron and Muellbauer (2006b) . Housing wealth is measured as the real stock of housing multiplied by the real house price index. In the short-run, as the stock changes slowly, housing wealth can be approximated by the change in real house prices. It could, however, represent consumer confidence as well as wealth or collateral.
How transparent is the South African Reserve Bank?
The last decade has seen a trend towards governments granting independence to central banks, and requiring accountability for their actions. Improved accountability has been facilitated by a parallel trend towards greater transparency and openness of central banks. This enhanced transparency to the public may also serve to protect the independence of central banks (Blinder et al., 2001) . Recent economic thinking suggests that greater transparency of policy may also influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. Anchoring agents' inflationary expectations around a credible target facilitates a more moderate approach to shocks by the central bank as agents will discount short-term volatility. By increasing the predictability of interest rate policy, market interest rate volatility is reduced, lowering uncertainty in the economy. further as the institutional design of the system matures (for instance, if the model is published, the score will rise to 10). The scores are based on available information, and can be verified.
The Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand offer benchmarks for high transparency in targeting systems with accumulated experience. The Reserve Bank of Australia's score is on a par with that of the SARB. Political transparency gains the full score for the SARB.
Policy and operational transparency gain 2 out of 3 respectively. The score is lowest at 1 out of a possible 3 for the specific categories of economic transparency and procedural transparency.
While the categorization of transparency above is systematic and objective, the weighting given to the different categories is subjective, and may also depend on the state of development of the economy. With the equal weighting of Eijffinger-Geraats, we find transparency (and hence may meet the objective of enhancing predictability of future interest rate policy (Svensson, 2001; Svensson et al, 2002) . However, Goodhart (2005) argues that if an MPC's non-constant forecast were to be published, it might be regarded by the public as more of a commitment than a uncertain forecast; and it might influence the private sector's forecasts by more than its own uncertainty warranted (see also Morris and Shin, 2004 ).
We present two other possible weightings in Table 3 , one suggested by Mr. Plenderleith, formerly of the MPC of the SARB, and the other derived by us from a different weighting system used by Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) . The normalized scores show that SA's relative transparency improves under both.
Has monetary policy become more credible?
If economic agents believe that the central bank will achieve its inflation target, their inflation expectations are more likely to be anchored around the inflation target, and price and wage setting will be far less responsive to temporary fluctuations in inflation, creating stability. The cost of expectations not being anchored to the target is that a more aggressive monetary policy may be required to gain credibility for the central bank in its price stabilising goal.
In principle, examining the evolution of inflation expectations before and after the adoption of inflation targeting could reveal whether there has been convergence to the target -or equivalently, whether monetary policy is credible to agents. If expectations with the same forecast horizon enter the target range over time, this is a necessary condition for convergence, but it is not sufficient. It could be a lucky accident e.g., if expectations were purely backward-looking and inflation fell due to globally lower inflation, or if a terms of trade shock appreciated the currency.
We examine the new survey of inflation expectations 19 from the Bureau of Economic
Research (BER) (Kershoff, 2000; Kershoff et al, 1999) . 1999-2003. 21 Other analyses of the trends of these expectations (Wesso and Kock, 2003 ; and the SARB's Monetary Policy Review) have not explicitly tried to control for this factor. 22 In order to utilise all the information in this short data set, we have chosen the third quarter in Figure 3 because it is the first quarter used in the survey in its first year, 2000 and is also available in 2005. 23 The BER household expectations data (not considered here) for a 12-month ahead view of CPI inflation are problematic e.g., because of widespread illiteracy, see Kershoff (2000) . The data suggest households' inflation expectations substantially exceed those of the analysts and indeed, recorded CPI inflation. Another way of gauging inflation expectations is by looking at the spread between indexlinked bonds and other domestic bonds of a similar maturity structure ( Figure 3 ). However, interpretation of these trends in terms solely of credibility is problematic. The yield differential is a function of the expected inflation rate over the horizon, but also of inflation risk. With the maturity period constantly decreasing, such risk obviously will fall, reducing the spread. Further, a high demand for a small issue of bonds will affect the perceived liquidity of the bond and drive down the yield. In Figure 3 , the break-even rates shown are largely within the target from early 2003. If there is a sharp change over a short period this would be indicative of changed expectations -assuming little change in the perceived liquidity of the bonds. However, for longer periods, little can be deduced about increased credibility of monetary policy, unless an adjustment is made for maturity and shifts in liquidity. Further, expectations may be largely backwardlooking, so that spreads may fall in the target range simply because of exogenous events.
Market anticipation of interest-rate decisions
Proper communication by the central bank about the factors that explain policy should improve the predictability of monetary policy. More predictable interest rates signal that the central bank's policy rule is well understood, and there is little asymmetric information between central bank and the private sector. If the volatility of market rates is thereby lowered, this reduces uncertainty in financial markets and the real economy, encouraging investment (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) .
Predictability by market analysts
The shift in market rates due to interest rate decisions by the central bank is termed the "surprise factor": a large shift indicates the market has not fully anticipated the decision. The predictability of interest rates under inflation targeting was assessed using monthly Reuters data on analysts'
interest rate forecasts, beginning in 2000. 25 We used the shortest available prediction periods by market analysts of the prime market rate. One, two and three month ahead forecasts of the end of quarter prime rate are compared to the realised prime and repo rates in Figure 4 . This shows, for each quarter, how the expectations of the end of quarter interest rate compared with the actual outcome, and how they evolved over three months, in the light both of repo rate decisions and economic news. The top graph shows the actual forecasts for the end of each quarter. The graph beneath shows the analysts' prediction errors or "surprises".
The predictions have a maximum error of about 1.25 percent (and usually far less). 26 The "surprise factor" has been greater for SA than some other targeting countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the UK (Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002) 
Predictability by market traders
A recent study uses daily data on forward rate interest agreements (FRAs) 28 at various horizons, to examine whether market traders correctly predict SARB interest rate decisions before each MPC meeting (Ballim and Moolman, 2005) . The authors reproduce the technique of Roley and Sellon (1995) , and others, for South African data. The daily FRA data have the advantage over the monthly Reuters expectations data in controlling for news at a much shorter horizon. The following regression was run
where α i is the estimated constant and β i is the estimated coefficient in regression i, ∆r t represents the change in SARB's repo rate, and e i is the error term. While four regressions were run in this study, we are interested primarily in two of these, where ∆R 1,t is the change in market interest rate from the day following the previous MPC meeting at time t-1 to the day preceding the current meeting at time t, denoted "before"; and ∆R 2,t is the change in the closing market interest rate on the day preceding the current MPC meeting to the close on the meeting day, at time t, denoted "on". Results were reported for 3-monthly FRA agreements in 3-months' time, 6-months' time, Table 4 ). The 2x5 FRA data (a 3-month interest rate in two months' time) is more suitable than either the 1x4 or 3x6 FRAs.
We report results for two samples for the 1x4 and 2x5 FRAs -both absent from the earlier study -and for other maturities over the yield curve (Table 5 ). The samples begin with the first MPC meeting (2 March, 2000) , and respectively run to the end of 2004, and the end of June 2006. For all maturities over both samples, but particularly for the 1x4 and 2x5 regressions, there is a significant and sizeable coefficient in the "before" regressions. Thus, much of the change in market rates between the MPC meetings is explained by the change in the repo rate at the next MPC meeting. The far smaller but significant coefficients for the "on" regression (4.5 times smaller for the case of the 2x5 FRA), indicates there is some uncertainty in the day preceding the decision, but also allows for other "news" on the day of the decision. 31 One cannot draw a robust conclusion about the scope for improvements in monetary policy transparency and hence predictability from the significant "on" coefficients, as Ballim and Moolman do. However, a comparison of the "before" to "on" ratios with US interest rates for equivalent maturities and characteristics, could give some insight into relative predictability.
Ballim and Moolman do not report the standard errors of their equations, or focus on the prediction errors of the market traders. Average standard errors are given in Table 5 , while Figure 5 illustrates the residuals for the "before" regression for the 1x4, 2x5 and 3x6 FRAs. The key finding is that the market traders usually make smaller errors than the market analysts above, as one would expect from daily data (which give smaller scope for news to feed into errors , in the form of fan-charts (e.g. none of output). The past forecast errors of these models are not evaluated. Table 3 shows that these facts lower the SARB's economic transparency score. It is not possible to judge forecasting and modeling without access to published models. We have attempted a crude analysis of the SARB's forecast errors using the fan-charts. 34 Table 6 shows the size of errors both one year ahead and two years ahead for each of the fan-charts. percent, compares with an outcome of 7.6 percent, overestimated the speed with which inflation was to fall after the exchange rate and food price shocks. This could be consistent with omitted 32 The SARB's suite of models apparently comprises a core model, a small-scale model, vector autoregressive models, Phillips-curve models and a monthly disaggregated forecasting model ( Van der Merwe, 2004) . 33 Forecasts are conditional: but private sector economists have complained about the lack of information on the assumptions (e.g. of oil prices, the exchange rate and degree of pass-through). 34 The central forecasts are not published in numerical form, and we have estimated them from the pictures. 
How has monetary policy reacted to external and domestic shocks?
The Stals ANC era: 1994q2-1999q1
Following elections in April, 1994, the new government was committed to a long-term development strategy for generating rapid and widely-shared growth in two highly publicised programmes
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. Post-election growth performance proved disappointing, after an initial upturn.
Real annual GDP growth averaged 0.5 percent in 1998 and 2.4 percent in 1997, compared to 4.2 and 3.1 percent in 1996 and 1995, respectively. Apart from SA's labour market inflexibility, increased trade competition and a declining gold price from late 1996, probably the most important factor impeding growth was high real interest rates (Aron and Muellbauer, 2002a) .
Capital inflows increased markedly after the elections, though from a low base following a decade of financial sanctions. Flows, particularly short-term flows, accelerated with the lifting of exchange controls on non-residents in March, 1995, after the dual exchange rate system was unified. These structural shifts implied a transition to a new "permanent" or long-run equilibrium level of inflows. The change from negligible flows to a new sustainable level of inflows, for given capital and trade controls, required adjustment via a more appreciated real exchange rate. Aron and Elbadawi (1999) argue that the SARB had dual policy objectives from April, 1994 until the first currency crisis in February, 1996: to contain inflation through an interest rate policy based on explicit monetary targets; and to stabilise the nominal exchange rate by preventing appreciation of the currency. 36 Despite large and persistent currency interventions, the SARB claimed the Rand was floating and that intervention was to smooth temporary and reversible short-term fluctuations (Stals, 1995b) . However, during the 21 months from the elections, the nominal bilateral rand/dollar exchange rate moved by no more than 2 percent from R3.65/$, while in April, 1995 to January, 1996, the range was even narrower, moving in an "implicit" band of R3.65±1 percent. The steady bilateral rate in the face of huge net capital inflows was viewed by many investors as an implicit, "one-sided" nominal target (e.g. Union
Bank of Switzerland, February, 1996) .
With an open capital account and persistent capital flows, a policy trade-off arises where sustaining an exchange rate "target" may occur at the expense of higher inflation, higher interest rates and eventually reduced output (e.g. Obstfeld, 1996) . Heavy unsterilised intervention in the market occurred at the expense of monetary targets (Stals, 1995b ) -sterilisation of the effects of the reserve accumulation began only late in 1994. Private sector credit grew strongly. Deviations of money growth from target growth zones and persistent overshooting from 1994 onwards are evident in Figure 6 . Monetary policy was tightened considerably, attracting even more inflows.
The exchange rate intervention was clearly unsustainable. Foreign investors anticipated a significant relaxation of domestic exchange controls at the Budget in early March, 1996, to help Stals combat the appreciation. In the event, the intended decontrol package was put on hold until July, 1997. However, the currency crisis was well underway by mid-February, and the bilateral Rand had depreciated 20 percent by late April. The SARB intervened massively to avoid depreciation of the currency. Of a net cumulative intervention of US$5.3 billion (mid-February to the end of April), about US$3.5 billion occurred via the forward market (CREFSA, 1996) .
Later crises occurred in October, 1996 , November, 1997 and April, 1998 largely by contagion effects from the Asian crisis (and declining prices of gold and other metals).
The prime rate rose to 20.25 percent after the first crisis, and remained at that level until the end of 1997, falling to 18.25 percent just prior to the April, 1998 crisis, when it rose as high as 25.5
36 Subsidiary goals were to withdraw from the forward foreign exchange market, and to accumulate foreign reserves (Stals, August, 1994) . 
Inflation targeting under Mboweni: 1999q3-2004q2
Mboweni's Governorship began in mid-1999 and inflation targeting in February, 2000. There followed an eighteen month period of stasis in nominal interest rates and relative stability in real interest rates (Figures 8 and 9 ). The variable repo rate announced at around 12 percent in the first MPC meeting in October, 1999 was still around this level in May, 2001 (Table 4 The most challenging episode to face the MPC since the beginning of inflation targeting began in 2001Q4. Given the information available at the time, their interest rate responses in the 37 The NOFP is the uncovered part of the oversold forward book: NOFP = (forward purchases of $ -forward sales of $) + net international reserves (excluding gold). 38 There was no impact on the prime rate, as for cost reasons the commercial banks generally do not act on 25 basis point changes.
aftermath are hard to fault. Our own interpretation of the unexplained shock in 2001 agrees with many financial market participants giving evidence to the Myburgh Commission, who put the main emphasis on two factors. The first is the market perception that the well-signalled intention of the SARB to shrink the NOFP had created the impression of a 'one-way bet' in terms of currency depreciation.
The second is the tightening of foreign exchange regulations in October, 2001, which resulted in a 39 The NBER business cycle dating committee later declared that March, 2001 marked the beginning of a technical recession. 40 We estimated VAR models on quarterly data, consisting of eight variables: oil price or gold price inflation, the output gap, exchange rate change, import price inflation, PPI inflation, CPI inflation, shortterm interest rate, and money growth. The reduced form residuals from the VAR are orthogonalized using a Cholesky decomposition to identify the structural shocks, where the variables are in the order given above (see also, McCarthy, 2000) . With such rich specifications, there is some risk of over-fitting, which may under-estimate the size of unexplained shocks.
sharp reduction in liquidity in the foreign exchange market. In thin markets, volatility is likely to increase, and with the perception of the 'one-way bet', this took the form of a sharp fall in the value of the Rand. Evidence for the liquidity reduction comes in two forms. First, the sharp rise in buy-sell spreads in the forward market after the tightening of regulations was announced.
Second, on the SARB's own evidence, higher foreign exchange volatility had, in the past, almost always been associated with higher trading volumes. However, volumes shrank in October to December, 2001, signalling a liquidity problem 41 .
We now examine the inflationary implications of these shocks. Estimates of pass-through from exchange rate shocks to CPIX in the VAR models, suggest a cumulative effect on CPIX of around 10 percent after 4 quarters and 15 percent after 7 quarters. Taking the fourth quarter 'exogenous shock' to be 11 percent, and the 2002Q1 shock to be 3 percent (see above), such pass-through models predict that the level of CPIX by 2002Q4 would be around 1. 41 Bhundia and Ricci (2005) place more weight on unspecified nominal shocks and cite "the acceleration of money supply growth from around mid-2001" as a potential source of such shocks (p.166). However, the money stock data were distorted by the restructuring of De Beers and the Anglo American Corporation, while amongst other factors, the private sector's liquidity preference was increased through greater precautionary and speculative demand for money (Quarterly Bulletin, March 2002 p.38-9) . 42 This is due to neglecting the effect of higher food prices on other prices and on inflationary expectations. Given the SARB's inflation forecasts shown in Table 6 (Table 6 ), implying a tightening of policy, raising the one-year ahead real repo rate to 7.8 percent. Moreover, the effective exchange rate had strongly recovered over 6 months, mainly due to sustained increases in commodity prices; inflation had already fallen; and the SARB had recently become aware of a likely overstatement in the inflation data, though not of its precise magnitude. Stopford's revelation of the overstatement of inflation in Statistics South Africa's data was made public in April (Stopford, 2003 
Has policy reduced interest rate and output volatility?
The volatility and performance indicators summarised in Table 1 are hard to interpret without taking into account the varying size and nature of shocks in the different periods. Under the present governor, Tito Mboweni, from 1999Q3, the volatility of headline CPI, initially rose 44 Unit labour costs were estimated at an 11.1 percent annual change for non-agricultural sector for 2002Q3 (later revised down to 8.9 percent). For the manufacturing sector, the annual increase in unit labour costs to 2002Q3 was estimated at only 1.1 percent, later revised down to an incredible minus 2.3 percent (see SARB Quarterly Bulletin). 45 There are two main steps in the argument. The first assumes that the inflation error resulted in an overestimate of the forecast inflation rate, partly because of inflation persistence via wage and price formation, and partly because of commonly used intercept adjustment used by forecasters when previous forecasts are seriously off track, as was clearly believed to be the case in early 2003. The second step assumes that the SARB, like other central banks analysed by Clarida et al (1998) , 'leant against the wind' by raising the repo rate by more than forecast inflation. Thus, even if the 1.2 percentage point inflation error averaged over a year resulted in a smaller upward bias of say 0.8 percentage points in the forecast inflation rate, this could easily translate into a repo rate higher by 1 percentage point or more.
substantially, given an increased weight on the mortgage component of the CPI and an increase in the volatility of nominal interest rates. However, the volatility of inflation measured by the consumer expenditure deflator fell. The volatility of output growth remained the same, while the growth rate improved. Given the shocks of this period, this can be regarded as a significant achievement: the tail-end of the 1998Q3 exchange rate shock and the policy reaction to it, and the exchange rate shock of 2001Q4, shocks to U.S. producer prices as well as to US output, equity prices and interest rates, made this a volatile period for monetary policy. The volatility of real interest rates rose slightly from that in the second Stals period 46 , and the average level of real rates (not adjusted for tax) declined from 11.5 percent under Stals to 7.7 percent.
Du Plessis and Smit (2003) 
Are real interest rates too high under inflation targeting?
Critics of the monetary policy framework in SA argue that it has resulted in real interest rates being kept too high, with a consequent cost in growth and high unemployment. Our objection to this view has been discussed elsewhere (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) . We summarise the main points here.
Power, in 2004 47 has argued that equity finance in SA is inordinately expensive and constrains growth. Given assumptions about the size of the equity premium relative to government bonds, he puts this down to high bond yields, blaming the aggressive application of inflation targeting. There are serious problems with his argument and his proposed alternative monetary framework of exchange rate targeting.
46 On a measure using the forward-looking inflation rate, volatility declined. 47 The equity cost of capital is discussed, for example, in a Business Day (SA) article on 4 August, 2004. First, bank finance is an important alternative to equity finance 48 and tax-adjusted real borrowing rates have been moderate. The relevant tax rate for companies is the real and after-tax rate, as interest payments by companies are tax-deductible (Jansen, 2004) . In Table 7 Another perspective on comparative real interest rates is given by an open economy view of the drivers of real rate differentials of government bonds. These are relevant for Power's argument about equity finance, and because they influence the cost of corporate bond finance.
These bond differentials have fallen since the late 1990s in SA, but not as far as expected. The question is why and whether monetary policy is to blame. The real bond rate differential between SA, and, say, the US, is given by the expected real depreciation of the Rand against the Dollar, plus a risk premium. The risk premium reflects real exchange rate uncertainty (a combination of nominal exchange rate and relative inflation uncertainty), global risk appetite (i.e. the willingness of global investors to invest in emerging market assets), political uncertainty and administrative restrictions, for example, on capital flows (Kahn and Farrell, 2004) . Quantitative and qualitative information can help elucidate the factors behind high real bond rates in SA.
One element in the risk premium, abstracting from real exchange rate uncertainty, is sovereign risk, the market's perception of the probability of default by the South African government on its foreign denominated bonds. It is measured by the spread between South African foreign denominated government bonds (e.g. the 2017 US Dollar denominated bond, first issued in 1997) and those of foreign governments (e.g. the US government) over comparable duration. Sovereign risk spreads narrowed for most emerging markets, and approached their previous lows achieved in 1997-98, by 2005. 48 In each year of the last decade new equity finance accounted for less than 4 percent of the funding of industrial companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Jansen, 2004) . Debt, including trade credit, made up 40-50 percent of funding, with retained earnings accounting for around 40 percent. The situation is similar in the UK and other major economies. 49 We employ short-term market interest rates, and, for comparability, backward-looking annual inflation rates, adjusting nominal rates for tax using the KPMG annual survey on corporate tax rates.
Quantitative work by Ahmed et al (2005) on the determinants of SA's sovereign spread ( Figure 9 ) finds that for 1997-2003, the improved global risk appetite (proxied by the emerging market bond index spread in the figure) partly explains the reduced spread. Part of it is due to the shorter horizon of the bonds: as the date of maturity moves closer, risk diminishes over the shorter horizon. The spread is lower the higher are gross foreign exchange reserves, the lower is the size of the forward book, the lower is recent exchange rate depreciation and the higher is the growth rate of GDP. This work suggests the spread in Figure 9 should have fallen by even more.
All the main factors driving the spread have moved in the right direction: the forward book has been retired; global risk appetite has fallen to historic lows; the state of the public finances has improved significantly; the recent relative growth record has improved; the exchange rate has appreciated and the time to maturity of the 2017 bond is now 12 years instead of the 20 years it had been in 1997.
While the measured factors show rigorous links to sovereign risk, there are slowly evolving, hard-to-measure factors that also matter. These could be accounting for the failure of creates incentives for other economic policies to encourage efficiency and competition, which help to hold down inflation, improve growth and permit lower interest rates. Modern investment theory puts much emphasis on uncertainty discouraging or at least postponing investment. In SA the forward-looking, tax-adjusted real prime rate for business has been under 1 percent since 50 Grandes et al (2003 Grandes et al ( , 2005 calculate the currency premium -that part of the one year interest rate differential with the US not due to sovereign risk, for Rand-denominated bonds of one year maturity, as 728 basis points over 2000-2002. Their empirical study on the determinants of the currency premium suggests retirement of the NOFP has reduced the currency premium; building up foreign exchange reserves reduces the risk of speculative attacks; inflation targeting with the target being met reduces the premium; but that the effect of capital control regulations is hard to evaluate. However, they do not explicitly mention the most obvious reason for the 728 basis points premium -the inflation differential between SA and the US. Their empirical work is flawed by this and other problems, including finding that the most significant variables explaining the one year premium have the opposite sign of that predicted by their theory.
2000. Continued reductions in uncertainty permitted by the inflation targeting framework, are likely to do more for investment than unsustainable reductions in real interest rates, likely to increase instability.
Structural aspects over which monetary policy has no direct influence also help to explain the cost of capital. The World Bank's World Development Report 2004 emphasises international differences in the cost of doing business as an explanation for investment, productivity and growth difference between nations. The 'Doing Business' score sheet for SA compares well with the average for OECD economies in many respects, especially in access to credit. In two dimensions it falls behind: rigidity of employment (high costs of hiring and firing);
and the recovery rate after bankruptcy proceedings, reported as 32 percent, compared with an OECD average of 72 percent. Crime rates were not part of the score sheet, but are clearly far higher than for the OECD average. These three aspects increase the risk of doing business, and so contribute to raising the expected return required before private investors will invest.
Further, there are costs related to redistribution. SA has a tragic legacy from the Apartheid years of exclusion of black South Africans from economic life -from quality education, many types of jobs, entrepreneurship and land-ownership. It is inevitable that as the gradual process of redistribution takes place, the returns to capital, whether existing or new, will effectively be 'taxed' in some form to fund this redistribution. In anticipation of such future 'taxes' -whether these involve the transfer of mining rights, compulsory purchase of land, pressure to source from black-owned companies or literal taxes, it seems likely that investors will require an additional risk premium to invest in SA. The more gradual, transparent and predictable is this "taxation" process, the lower is likely to be the risk premium.
Conclusion and complementary policies
This paper has contrasted the monetary policy regimes under Stals and Mboweni since 1994.
Under inflation targeting, transparency and accountability have improved immensely, and further improvements are in prospect. There is evidence of a gain in credibility and anchoring of inflationary expectations under targeting. The suggested improvements for greater central bank transparency should improve the predictability of interest rates. Building models that reflect more accurately the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism, particularly through asset prices, is an ongoing process (see . It would be useful to open these models to public scrutiny and to the international research community. One of the advantages of the inflation targeting framework, which could be more appreciated by commentators, is that it creates positive incentives for politicians. Inflation is reduced by supply side improvements, for example, in productivity and competition. A privatization may involve a trade-off between somewhat higher short-term gains to the Treasury by allowing monopoly rents to be earned, and a more competitive structure which will lower inflation. Knowing that the SARB would be compelled to reduce interest rates because of lower inflation increases the attraction of the competitive alternative. While the motivation is understandable, nevertheless policies that restrict tendering for contracts to achieve ambitious short-term targets for black empowerment or affirmative action employment are liable to raise inflation rates through reduced productivity and reduced competition. Having a national focus on the SARB's inflation target and knowing what the interest rate response will eventually be should help to restrain policies with inflationary implications.
As Svensson has emphasised in his reviews of monetary policy in Norway and New
Zealand (Svensson, 2001; Svensson et al, 2002) , however well monetary policy is run, it is only one policy arena relevant for determining macro-economic outcomes. Fiscal policy, the legal and regulatory framework, and the quality of data available to the Central Bank and to the Treasury all have important implications for outcomes (see Section 5). Regular refreshment of firm-based censuses and surveys of employment is standard international practice. Failure by Statistics South Africa until recently to follow such practices 51 has meant that estimates of unit labour costs, productivity growth and employment growth for South Africa have long been highly unreliable, creating much greater uncertainty about basic economic trends, than faced by other major central banks. Another important instance has been the costly problem with CPI data construction (discussed in section 5, and in greater detail in ). Poor data quality is particularly unfortunate in view of the reliance on modeling under the targeting framework.
Modern time series models require two or more decades of reliable data to achieve robust results.
Historical data errors unfortunately continue to affect modeling attempts in the future, resulting in a long-lasting deterioration in the quality of future models, forecasts and policy deliberations.
We now consider some policies complementary to monetary policy. We have already argued, in our discussion of the supposedly high cost of capital in SA, that government policies which affect sovereign risk have an influence on the cost of capital. We also argued there that the rectification of the injustice and inequality inherited from the past involve policies raising the risks for private investment in SA. The more transparent, predictable and, in some cases, gradual, are these policies, the better will be the redistribution/growth trade-off.
Economic activity in SA is very responsive to short-term interest rates. One reason is the efficiency of its financial and legal systems, which make its credit markets among the most liberal in the world. The other reason is the floating rate nature of much private debt, which exposes households and businesses to interest rate fluctuations. The floating rate nature of debt is partly the result of volatile inflation and interest rates. As volatility subsides with credible monetary policy, the private sector may be more willing to offer longer-term debt contracts. There may be a role for government to aid in this process via financial regulation, greater transparency and improving information for borrowers.
A paradox of the success of inflation targeting is that it may have exacerbated rising household debt, and hence contributed to higher house prices and lower saving. Faith in the lower volatility of inflation, interest rates and output is likely to raise desired debt to income ratios further (though there is scope for an increase with these ratios less than half those in the UK in 2004 This would avoid the confusion to wage negotiators of choosing between CPI and CPIX, and the risk that trade unions will demand compensation for whichever of the two has risen more. 3. The volatility measures are defined as follows: e.g. for inflation, the absolute value of the annual percentage change in inflation less annual percentage change in inflation one year ago. This measure places less emphasis on outliers than the conventional standard deviation. 4. Unlike the CPI, the consumer price deflator (CPD) contains no interest rate component; nor does the CPIX ("metropolitan and urban"), but it is available from 1994 only, and policy-relevant from 2000. 5. Nominal and real effective exchange rates are the latest measure excluding Zimbabwe, spliced in 1990 to the preceding measure, which includes Zimbabwe. Table 4 and JPMorgan, Johannesburg. Notes:
1. The regression is ∆R i,t = α i + β i ∆r t + e i,t i= 1,2 , where α i is the estimated constant, ∆r t represents the change in SARB's repo rate, β i (before) is the estimated coefficient in the regression where ∆R 1,t is the change in market interest rate from the day following the previous MPC meeting at time t-1 to the day preceding the current meeting at time t, denoted "before"; and β i (on) is the estimated coefficient in the regression where ∆R 2,t is the change in the closing market interest rate on the day preceding the current MPC meeting to the close on the meeting day, at time t, denoted "on". 2. t-ratios are in parenthesis under the coefficients; the reported sigmas are the standard errors of the equations, with the R 2 in parenthesis beneath them. 3. The samples cover 32 MPC meetings from the start of inflation targeting to the end of 2004 (excluding the technical adjustment meeting, see Table 4 ), and 41 meetings to the end of June, 2006, see Table 4 . Note: The full sample from March, 2000 to mid-June, 2006 is used in these regressions (see Table 4 and 5). Source: A rise in the SARB's REER index denotes appreciation. The prime rate is from the IMF. The real prime is defined using the consumer price deflator and a log approximation. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 M3 growth (12 month)
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